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VAT EFFICIENCY IN THE COUNTRIES WORLDWIDE 
 
 
Abstract 
The article aims to estimate the efficiency of value-added tax (VAT) collection in the 
countries worldwide.  
In a large part of developing and transition countries VAT performs primarily fiscal function, 
being the main source of budget revenue (for example in 2014 in Ukraine the revenue obtained 
from VAT was 51% of total tax revenue, in Moldova it achieved 58,2%). At the same time the 
shadow economy particularly in form of corruption and tax evasion that exists in these countries 
leads to a considerable tax gap which in turns reduces VAT efficiency.  
So, the present study intends to define the VAT efficiency ratio in countries of the world. 
Preliminary theoretical and methodological analysis allowed us to use for calculations a 
modification of widespread formula, considering in a certain way a tax evasion process. We 
investigated the dependence between VAT efficiency ratio and size of shadow sector and level of 
corruption in countries.  
This research will allow further investigation of the strategies for establishing of optimal VAT 
rates depending on efficiency of its levying and size of taxpayers which in turns will contribute to 
raising efficiency of VAT administration, to the reduction of shadow sector and to the economic 
growth. 
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Introduction 
In the latter half of the 20th century the taxation of consumption in most 
countries of the world became based on value-added taxes instead of sales taxes.  
This determined an increase in revenue obtained from VAT collection and 
simultaneous increase of complexity of its administration. The tax exemptions, tax 
incentives, zero-tax rates etc. could be considered one of the main reasons of 
administration’s complexity, which in turns favored to the growth of the shadow 
sector and the level of corruption.  
These negative factors can be diminished considerably by an effective VAT. 
Commonly it implies the minimum difference between estimated and actually 
collected tax revenue. I.e. it is referred to the tax compliance. In turn the estimation of 
VAT efficiency can provide the necessary information concerning level of VAT 
compliance in given country in order to determine the directions of improving of 
VAT administration. 
So, this article aims to estimate quantitatively the efficiency of VAT collection 
in the countries of the world in order to investigate the dependence between VAT 
efficiency ratio and size of shadow sector and level of corruption. 
Literature review 
There are a number of theoretical and empirical studies aiming to estimate a tax 
compliance rates in the countries.  
A large part of them consider a VAT compliance rate as ratio of actual VAT 
revenue to estimated VAT liabilities. In the Table 1 we summarize main previous 
studies in this area.  
As it was mentioned above the efficiency of consumption taxes is closely 
associated with tax compliance rate. The main characteristic of this rate, and 
accordingly of the tax efficiency, is the estimation of the tax gap arising in 
consequence of tax non-compliance. 
 
Table 1. 
Authors and their main findings 
Authors Sample 
and period 
VAT compliance rate formula Main findings 
Agha & 
Houghton 
(1996)
 
 
17 OECD 
countries, 
1987 
                  
                         
  
A higher VAT rate is associated with lower compliance. Compliance is 
substantially lower with multiple VAT rates. The more time to comply VAT 
the more is VAT compliance rate. The lesser country’s population, the better 
is the VAT compliance. 
Andrews & 
Mansoora 
(1996)  
9 
European 
countries, 
1990-1993 
Tax compliance ratio 
              
                 ⁄  
Tax compliance is a major issue in most analyzed countries. The ratio of 
actual to potential revenues (effective tax rates) is much lower than the 
official payroll tax rates.  
Tanzi & 
Davoodi 
(2000) 
83 
countries, 
1980-1997 
 
                  
   
            
⁄  
{0;1} 
The higher is the ratio, the more productive is VAT system. The lower is the 
ratio the more widespread is the extent of exemptions, tax evasion or weak 
tax administration. The higher is perception of corruption the lower is VAT 
efficiency ratios 
Nam et al. 
(2001)
 
 
10 EU 
countries, 
1994-1996 
Tax collection performance ratio:  
                     
                                 
 
Positive correlation between the tax evasion and the level of VAT tax rates 
was less significant in the EU countries. 
Otranto et al. 
(2003)  
Italy, 
1982–
2001. 
                     
                    
 
There is a positive relationship between VAT evasion and such factors as 
GDP, the share of the fiscal burden, the ratio of gross profits, the value added 
over the economy. The amnesty granted by government to tax evaders can 
have a negative effect on the level of the VAT gap 
Daniel et al. 
(2003) 
Emerging 
market and 
industrial 
economies 
Effective indirect tax rate:  
                                    
                   
 
A noticeable difference in effective indirect tax rates between industrial and 
emerging market economies. Emerging market economies generally have 
lower revenue ratios and effective tax rates than industrial countries. A 
considerable difference, measured by the coefficient of variation, in the 
volatility of effective tax rates. 
O’Donoaghue 
et al. (2004)
 
 
12 EU 
countries, 
1998 
Effective indirect tax rate: 
                 
                      
 
The effective indirect tax is on average three times higher for the bottom 
income decile than for the top decile 
Christie & 
Holzner 
(2006)  
29 EU 
countries, 
2000-2003 
                  
                         
 
VAT compliance is not affected by issues of inequality or poverty. A higher 
weighted average VAT rate reduces VAT compliance while a greater quality 
of judicial/legal system increases it. Countries where local authorities have 
more power have lower levels of VAT compliance. 
Reckon LLP 
Report (2009) 
25 EU 
countries, 
2000-2006  
VAT gap share:  
       
                         
 
There is no reliable statistical evidence of a relationship between the VAT 
burden and the VAT gap share. A lower perception of corruption appears to 
reduce the VAT gap share. Countries with a larger population have a larger 
VAT gap share.  
Giesecke & 
Tran (2010)
 
 
Vietnam, 
1999-2005 
                            
                           
 
VAT gap is generally determined by proliferation of both non-standard VAT 
rates and legal exemptions. Increase of VAT rates and removing/reducing 
exemptions can be an effective way of raising VAT revenue. 
Barbone et al. 
(2013) 
26 EU 
countries, 
2000-2011 
The VAT Gap: 
                            
                      
Compared to VAT system with a single rate, no exemptions, and with 
perfect enforcement of tax laws the most important amount of revenue loss 
stemmed (in most countries) from choices made over time that have 
introduced and sometimes extended multiple rates and exemptions.  
OECD (2012) 33 OECD 
countries, 
1976-2009 
VAT Revenue Ratio (VRR): 
                   
                                
 
The level of the standard rate has a limited influence on the VRR. The 
different factors such as particular market circumstances, change in 
consumption patterns etc., significantly affect the VRR 
Keen (2013)  Countries 
worldwide
, 
1993-2012 
The compliance gap: difference between 
the amount of VAT that is payable in 
principle and that actually received by 
government, expressed as a proportion of 
the former 
Compliance gap in most of OECD countries is quite extensive and it is 
primarily attributable to design rather than implementation. 
 
Methodology 
Broadly speaking all these estimations meet the definition of M. Keen (2013), 
according to which the compliance gap is simply the difference between the 
amount of VAT that is payable in principle and that actually received by 
government, expressed as a proportion of the former. 
I.e. VAT efficiency ratio is 
 
      
          
          
                                                           
where            and            denote the actual and estimated VAT 
revenue respectively.  
 
Economically, this efficiency ratio reflects the ability of government to collect 
tax revenue. The lower it is, the higher is the difference between real and declared 
income, and the fewer economic agents pay taxes. 
But it should be noted that calculation of this index as ratio of actual revenue 
obtained from collection taxes to estimated one does not take into account the fact 
that decrease in the tax revenue can be determined not only by shifting to the 
shadow sector, but also by decrease in production and sales, by using the tax 
planning strategies (tax avoidance), by applying tax exemptions, tax incentives, 
zero-tax rates etc. in the tax system; although these factors lead to the reduction of 
tax efficiency ratio, they conform to the current law. 
The availability of valid data, notably, concerning the share of revenue 
obtained from collection of certain tax in country’s GDP, determined the choice of 
VAT as type of universal excise in order to calculate an appropriate efficiency 
ratio.  
For this it is expedient to use formula (2), which contains the consumption 
costs. 
 
      
          
    
 
 
    
                                                  
where       is the final consumption of households as % of GDP;      is the 
standard VAT rate. 
 
Let’s analyze the formula (2). The VAT rate can be presented as ratio of 
estimated VAT revenue to the tax base. Therefore, the modification of (1) will be 
as follows: 
      
          
          
  
       
    
                                             
where         denotes the VAT tax base 
1
 
 
In terms of (3) the expression for EfVAT is in line with (1): it is the commonly 
used VAT efficiency ratio, but adjusted for the ratio of VAT tax base to the final 
consumption of households.  
It should be noted that formula (3) in a certain way takes into account the 
presence of tax evasion or underpayment of taxes, which influence negatively on 
VAT efficiency, since a large part of concealed income is spent on consumption, 
i.e. it is reflected in this ratio. 
Data 
Variables for calculating the VAT efficiency ratio come from the World 
Bank's World Development Indicators (WDI), OECD Statistics database, 
ministries of finance of countries. In further analysis we used estimates of the 
shadow sector made by F. Schneider (2015) and the corruption perception index 
(CPI) which was extracted from the database of the Transparency International. 
Results and Discussion  
The obtained results for the countries worldwide are presented in Table 2. 
 
 
                                                          
1
 Occasionally for calculations we used shares of actual VAT revenue and final consumption of households in GDP, 
since these data are indicated in the statistics. But this has no impact on the results. 
Table 2 
VAT efficiency ratio, 2012 
Country 
Final consumption of 
households, % of GDP 
VAT revenue, % of 
GDP 
Standard 
VAT rate, % 
EFVAT 
Argentina 66,12 8,7 21 0,63 
Australia 53,72 3,30 10 0,61 
Austria 53,63 7,75 20 0,72 
Belarus 45,92 6,33 20 0,69 
Belgium 51,75 6,90 21 0,63 
Brazil 62,62 8,50 18 0,75 
Canada 55,66 4,20 5 1,51 
Chile 62,75 8,06 19 0,68 
Czech Republic 49,36 7,06 21 0,68 
Denmark 48,82 9,71 25 0,80 
Estonia 52,59 8,54 20 0,81 
Finland 54,54 9,04 24 0,69 
France 55,45 6,82 20 0,61 
Germany 55,98 7,07 19 0,66 
Greece 69,36 7,15 23 0,45 
Hungary 53,78 9,11 27 0,63 
Iceland 53,36 8,05 25,5 0,59 
Ireland 45,99 5,92 23 0,56 
Israel 56,59 7,32 18 0,72 
Italy 61,14 5,90 22 0,44 
Japan 60,66 2,72 5 0,90 
Kenya 80,00 3,90 16 0,30 
Korea, Rep. 51,37 4,26 10 0,83 
Luxembourg 31,56 9,00 15 1,90 
Mexico 66,27 3,72 16 0,35 
Moldova 96,60 12,10 20 0,63 
Netherlands 45,05 6,50 21 0,69 
New Zealand 59,65 9,90 15 1,11 
Norway 40,45 7,70 25 0,76 
Poland 61,50 7,09 23 0,50 
Portugal 65,71 8,23 23 0,54 
Russia 49,09 5,70 18 0,65 
Slovak Republic 57,48 5,98 20 0,52 
Slovenia 56,20 8,04 22 0,65 
South Africa 60,73 6,07 14 0,71 
Spain 58,65 5,32 21 0,43 
Sweden 46,54 8,94 25 0,77 
Switzerland 54,34 3,50 8 0,81 
Turkey 70,19 5,75 18 0,46 
Ukraine 69,00 9,85 20 0,71 
United Kingdom 64,79 6,87 20 0,53 
 
In our calculations the index of final consumption of households considers the 
consumption of goods which are taxed not only by VAT and also by other 
consumption taxes, since the statistical services in countries do not normally 
delimit the consumption according the types of taxes. For countries with hybrid 
universal excises (Argentina, Brazil) the index of final consumption of households 
additionally includes the consumption of goods taxes by sales and turnover taxes. 
Taking into account the fact that other consumption taxes (excises, customs duties 
etc.) do not significantly influence on the tax revenue, and that they are presented 
to any extent in all examined countries, comparing the appropriate efficiency ratios 
(for the “pure” VAT and for consumption taxes at large), the general trend will not 
be distorted.  
It can be seen that Ukraine and Moldova differ from other countries by high 
actual VAT revenue, expressed as a share of GDP. Particularly, Moldova has the 
highest value of this parameter – 12,1% while Ukraine is on the third place with 
9,85%. Also Moldova is the “consumption” leader – 96,6% of country’s GDP is 
accounted for households’ final consumption. Kenya is on the second place with 
80%. Ukraine takes the fifth place with 69,0% after Turkey and Greece.  
The estimation of GDP is based on calculations of added value created by 
country’s economy, so the share of VAT in GDP in various countries differs 
insignificantly and depends more on tax rate itself, but not on such institutional 
factors as size of shadow sector, level of corruption etc. The high share of VAT 
revenue in the total tax revenue indicates the presence of considerable disparities in 
favor of VAT, which are determined by substantial quantity of resources needed 
for its collection and for administration. The further statistical analysis confirmed 
the negative correlation between the calculated VAT efficiency ratio and such 
indices as size of shadow sector (as % of GDP) and level of corruption (as 
Corruption Perception Index – CPI) in countries (Fig. 1(a) and 1(b)).  
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Fig. 1(a) The VAT efficiency ratio and the shadow sector in countries 
 
Although this correlation is not linear and not very strong, it is evident that 
VAT efficiency is influenced by other factors which are not considered in this 
study. The general negative correlation between the VAT efficiency ratio and 
shadow sector and CPI as well, could be explained based on the left side of the 
formula (3), i.e. that for transparent economies the share of the unpaid taxes is 
small, and the estimation of VAT revenue is sufficiently precise, and vice versa is 
true for non-transparent economies.  
Moreover, it could be noted that indicators for all analyzed countries are 
mainly localized in the rectangles ([0,4; 0,9]; [9; 30]) and ([0,4; 0,9]; [0,15; 0,9]) 
for the shadow sector and for the level of corruption respectively. 
 
VAT efficiency ratio vs. CPI, 2012
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Fig. 1(b) The VAT efficiency ratio and the CPI in countries  
 
As can be seen on the Fig.1, there are some countries plotted separately. 
Notably they differ by their level of the shadow economy and corruption which 
exceeds the average (for Argentina, Moldova and Kenya the CPI is within limits of 
default values); and also there are some developed economies with low level of 
corruption and shadow economy, characterizing by high efficiency of VAT 
collection: Canada, New Zealand, and Luxemburg (Japan fits partially into this 
group). To complete the picture we should note that two countries – Kenya and 
Mexico, have a lower VAT efficiency level than the left bound of the mentioned 
interval. These exceptions from the picture could be explained by the right side of 
the formula (3), namely by a relatively low (or high) level of final consumption 
compared with tax base. I.e., the more the country is developed, the more modest is 
its consumption. The VAT efficiency can be increased notably by optimization of 
the left side of the formula (3), i.e. by optimization of collected VAT. This lies 
deep in the general problem of optimization of the tax burden, considered by 
Laffer. The game model (Sokolovsky (2014)), which takes into account the 
possibility of tax evasion and develops the Laffer’s approach, providing  rationales 
for potential presence of some local maxima, could be used for analysis and 
optimization of VAT collection.  
Conclusion 
We found the negative correlation between the VAT efficiency ratio and 
shadow sector and CPI as well, which could be explained by the fact that for 
transparent economies the share of the unpaid taxes is small, and the estimation of 
VAT revenue is sufficiently precise, and vice versa is true for non-transparent 
economies. Certain exemptions from the picture could be justified by relatively 
low (or, conversely, high) level of final consumption compared with the tax base. 
So, the VAT efficiency can be increased notably by optimization of collected 
VAT. The directions for future research lie in analyzing of practical aspects of 
simplifying the VAT administration.  
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